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THE ILLUSIONS OF INTERNATIONALIZING WORLD
POLITICS
ERNEST W. LEFEVER*
On December 31, 1984, the United States withdrew its
participation in and support of UNESCO because that inter-
national body had become politicized and had lost sight of its
original purpose of encouraging scientific, cultural, and edu-
cational advancement, primarily in the Third World. In mid-
January of this year, the United States decided not to"partici-
pate in the Nicaraguan case before the World Court because
that case was, in the words of the State Department, "a mis-
use of the Court for political and propaganda purposes."
Alan Romberg, the department spokesman added: "We pro-
foundly hope that the Court does not go the way of other
international organizations that have become politicized
against the interests of the Western democracies." The
World Court, which the United States joined in 1949, de-
cided in November 1984 by a vote of 15 to 1 to take up the
charge of Nicaragua's Sandinista regime that the United
States had violated international law by supporting anti-
Sandinista guerrillas and mining a Nicaraguan port.
In an editorial criticizing the U.S. decision not to partici-
pate in the Nicaraguan case, the New York Times (January 20,
1985) said: "Strictly speaking, there being no world govern-
ment, there's no such thing as world law. There is no parlia-
ment to write the law and no policeman to enforce it. Yet
there sits this thing called the World Court, pretending for
much of this century not only to adjudicate some disputes be-
tween governments but also to define some norms of interna-
tional behavior . . ." The editorial acknowledged there is
"legitimate doubt" whether this was an appropriate case for
the Court (which was never intended to have jurisdiction
over warfare) and "whether all the Court's judges are suffi-
ciently independent of their government's policies."
The Times inexplicably concluded that the United States
is wrong for thumbing its nose at this "strange but real insti-
tution." The editorial reveals a persistent confusion between
the realities of international politics and the dream of taming
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the perennial struggle of power by internationalizing the pro-
cess for adjudicating, resolving, or preventing conflict among
sovereign states. It is this confusion I wish to address.
The Nature of Contemporary World Politics
World politics is a vast, unending drama with history as
its stage. Its actors today are some 160 legally sovereign
states, with the two superpowers as the chief antagonists. The
U.N. Charter confers "sovereign equality" on all states, but
as Samuel Grafton commented as the charter was being
drafted: "Even after you give the squirrel a certificate which
says that he is quite as big as an elephant, he is still going to
be smaller, and all the squirrels will know it and all the ele-
phants will know it." (New York Post, November 23, 1943).
Continuing the image, some states are like lions, some like
jackals, some like sheep, and some like mice. There are pred-
atory states and peaceful states. There are live-and-let-live
governments and even live-and-help-live governments.
World politics, like all politics, is a struggle of power and
purpose. Morality or ethics is an inescapable element in all
political behavior because such behavior, especially on the
part of the superpowers, has consequences for good or ill. Af-
ter World War II, Moscow incorporated Eastern Europe into
its "evil empire." In contrast, the United States and its allies
transformed Western Europe into a zone of freedom. Presi-
dent Truman's decision in 1950 to defend South Korea from
Communist aggression succeeded in preserving the freedom
and independence of more than 30 million people. Moscow's
invasion of Afghanistan has brought death and destruction to
millions. The less than adequate U.S. effort to defend the in-
dependence of South Vietnam led to its ultimate conquest by
an ally of the Soviet Union with dire consequences for the
Vietnamese people and for the state and people of Cambodia.
We could multiply examples.
We live in a dangerous world. Those who seek indepen-
dence, freedom, and genuine self-determination are
threatened by both chaos and predatory states, the most pow-
erful and brutal being the Soviet Union. There are also local
conflicts that have little to do with vital superpower interests,
but most regional conflicts involve the Soviet Union and the
United States. Since Hiroshima, there have been some 140
conflicts fought with conventional weapons which killed more
than ten million people. Independent states are threatened
by outright aggression as in Afghanistan, by externally sup-
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ported subversion as in El Salvador, and by international
terrorism.
The threat of nuclear war is often given center stage, but
perhaps equally dangerous is capitulation to nuclear black-
mail. For forty years the nuclear balance of terror has held
firm in spite of the forward surge of Soviet nuclear might in
the past fifteen years. The U.S. determination to offset par-
tially the threat posed by Soviet SS-20 missiles targeted
against NATO military facilities and cities from Oslo to Is-
tanbul has enhanced stability and made capitulation to Soviet
political demands less likely.
We live in a world where our most cherished val-
ues-freedom, order, justice, respect for human dignity-are
threatened by chaos, local and regional conflict, and the
predatory imperialism of the Soviet Union. It is not quite a
Hobbesian world of a "war of every man against every man"
because men are not totally selfish and there are historical
forces of order and decency at work. These constructive
forces must be harnessed to the power of governments if they
are to make their full contribution.
Rational Idealism vs. Historical Realism
The human drama is not without meaning. The Judeo-
Christian tradition asserts that our worldly existence is char-
acterized by a struggle between good and evil. In political
terms this means a struggle between freedom and tyranny,
justice and injustice, human right and oppression. Biblical re-
ligion declares both what is and what ought to be. It asks and
answers two questions of central concern to understanding
ethics and world politics: "What is the human situation?" and
"What is the duty of man?" An understanding of what is is
essential for understanding what ought to be.
Morally concerned persons in their zeal often become so
preoccupied with the imperatives of human responsibility
that they ignore the realities of human existence. This is es-
pecially true in the world arena where few people experience
the limitations on human action they take for granted in
their daily lives. This undisciplined moral fervor has often
lead to utopian crusades that have ended in disaster. The
long road from Versailles to Pearl Harbor and beyond is clut-
tered with the whitened bones of crusades that failed-the
League of Nations, peace through economic planning, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, world peace through world law, and
world government, to name a few.
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These crusades failed not for lack of good intentions or
enthusiasm but because the crusaders tended to believe that
morally desirable goals were politically possible because they
were morally desirable. They misread the facts of current his-
tory and the possibilities of the future because they failed to
understand the tragedies and contingencies of the whole
realm of history. They misunderstood history because they
did not understand the limits and possibilities of human na-
ture. As Reinhold Niebuhr has said: "Man's capacity for jus-
tice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injus-
tice makes democracy necessary." James Madison expressed
the same view in Federalist Paper 50: "If men were angels,
no government would be necessary."
Both Madison and Niebuhr are proponents of what
Niebuhr called historical realism as opposed to rational ideal-
ism. Rational idealism is the child of the Enlightenment and
Social Darwinism, and in its pure form it affirms the perfect-
ibility, or at least the improvability, of man and the possibil-
ity, if not the inevitability, of progress in history. It has confi-
dence in the triumph of man's nobler nature and tends to
rely on reason as the redemptive agent that can save man and
politics and eventually usher in an era of universal peace.
In contrast, historical realism emphasizes the moral lim-
its of human nature and history and has its roots in St. Au-
gustine, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Edmund Burke, and
Madison, along with most classical Western thinkers. Re-
jecting all forms of religious and secular utopian-
ism-including Facism and Communism-the post-Versailles
realists have included men as varied as Niebuhr, Carl L.
Becker, Winston Churchill, and Dean Acheson. Noting that
the extravagant expectation of the Wilsonian ideals were not
ratified by subsequent events, the realists hold that all politi-
cal achievements are limited by man's dogged resistance to
drastic reconstruction. Thus, perfect peace, justice, security,
and freedom are not possible in this world, though approxi-
mations of these lofty goals are not beyond man's grasp.
To the rational idealist, the "impossible ideal" is achieva-
ble because it is rationally conceivable. To the historical real-
ist, the "impossible ideal" is relevant because it lends humility
without despair and hope without illusion.
Of course, there are few consistent rational idealists or
historical realists, but we all tend to lean in one direction or
the other. Most Americans appear to be more optimistic
about the distant future than about the present where the
problems and difficulties are more vividly perceived.
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Two Legs Bad, Four Legs Good
Many rational idealists seem to assume that international
action and institutions are more noble or moral than unilat-
eral actions by states. A brief glance at recent history will ex-
plode this assumption. The Communist International was
hardly a benign force, nor is the Warsaw pact by which Mos-
cow holds its "allies" in thrall and threatens the freedom of
Western Europe. Few people would regard OPEC a construc-
tive force. And, of course, many unilateral actions by states
are constructive-ranging from self defense to helping an
ally to defend itself. The simple assertion that international
action is better than national action reminds one of George
Orwell's Animal Farm: "Two Legs Bad, Four Legs Good." It
is the moral quality and political wisdom of behavior that
counts, whether that behavior is expressed unilaterally, bilat-
erally, or through a regional or near-universal international
agency.
There is little debate about the necessity for and desira-
bility of governments cooperating with other governments to
achieve common ends. The political and moral confusion
arises when it is argued that state behavior has a higher ethi-
cal status or "does more good" if it is channeled through and
disciplined by a near-universal organization like the League
of Nations, the United Nations, or the World Court. The
problem becomes even more serious when it is suggested that
these universal agencies should be endowed with power and
sovereignty to curtail or limit the sovereignty of the partici-
pating states.
In structural terms, world politics can operate in only
two ways-with one government or with more than one gov-
ernment. From the beginning of history we have had the sec-
ond system-more than one government, whether isolated
tribes, tribes in conflict, city states, territorial states, nation
states, or empire states. Some rational idealists and many
utopians believe that wars, conflict, aggression, and tyranny
could be eliminated if we somehow could transform the
multi-state system into a one-state system. They believe world
government would solve our problems. But as Reinhold
Niebuhr pointed out in his classic essay, "The Illusion of
World Government" (Foreign Affairs, April 1949), an inclu-
sive international government invested with sovereign power
was neither politically possible .nor morally desirable. Sover-
eignty is the right to act without asking the permission of any
external agency. Would the Soviet Union, or for that matter,
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the United States, surrender this right to a higher authority
without the assurance that the values each regime cherishes
most would be fully protected in the new arrangement? Com-
petent Western observers believe that the highest value of
the men in the Kremlin is to hold on to the power and privi-
leges they enjoy. No universal government could offer them
this. The U.S. government and the American people likewise
could not be assured that the new universal order would pre-
serve the freedoms we now enjoy. Hence, neither the super-
powers nor the lesser states are prepared to sacrifice their
sovereignty to a superstate.
Even if it were possible, world government would not be
morally desirable because one global authority would be
tempted to become absolute and tyrannical. The new elite
would enjoy a monopoly of the instruments of coercion.
Since there would be no external foe, there would be no
need for an army to protect the state against external danger.
But there would be a world police force to deal with the dan-
gers from within-insurrection, disaffection, secession, con-
flict, terrorism, and other crimes. Unless the citizens of the
world state and the tribes, classes and interest groups they
belong to would be radically transformed into peaceful and
benign persons and organizations, conflict would persist. The
universal dream would probably become a universal
nightmare. Niebuhr concludes his critique of world govern-
ment with these words: "We may have pity upon, but can
have no sympathy with, those who flee to the illusory security
of the impossible from the insecurities and ambiguities of the
possible."
What is Both Possible and Responsible?
Laying aside the illusion of world government, some ide-
alists insist that we should develop "global systems of govern-
ance" (whatever that means) and as a first step strengthen
and improve the United Nations. If by "strengthening" the
United Nations is meant endowing it with a measure of sover-
eignty, this is by definition impossible. Sovereignty is not di-
visible. A state either has it or it does not. The claim that
sovereignty can be shared reminds me of the esteemed lady
in Madrid who was honored with "The Order of Chas-
tity-Second Class."
When a state submits a dispute with another state for ar-
bitration and is willing to abide by the result it has not sur-
rendered its sovereignty, but affirmed it. By submitting a par-
[Vol. I
WORLD POLITICS
ticular issue to a "higher authority" or to a third'party, the
state is exercising its sovereign right to act unilaterally or
otherwise. After all, it submits for external judgment only
what it wishes to. Members of the Common Market in Eu-
rope have not given up their sovereignty; they are affirming
it by voluntarily joining other states to achieve common
objectives. When their vital interests are at stake, govern-
ments will withdraw from the jurisdiction of any agency that
infringes on those interests, just as the United States has re-
fused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the World Court in
the Nicaraguan case.
The complicated and confusing conglomeration known
as the U.N. system that includes the World Court, the Secur-
ity Council, the General Assembly, and a score of specialized
agencies presents an interesting problem. As an historical re-
alist and a student of world politics, I believe that no part of
the U.N. system can or should be given sovereign authority.
In fact, no related agency claims to possess any. The United
Nations is not a supernational entity with a mind, will, and
power of its own. It is a forum, a continuing conference for
member states who do and should use it as an instrument of
statecraft.
The World Court convenes only when two or more con-
tending governments agree to submit to its jurisdiction and
its opinions cannot be imposed on any state. Decisions of the
General Assembly are not binding. The Security Council has
a built-in veto; consequently any of the five permanent mem-
bers can prevent action deemed inimical to its interests.
The specialized agencies have no independent existence
apart from supporting member states. All of these agencies
could and some of them have operated independent of the
U.N. system. The Universal Postal Union was established
long before the United Nations. Related U.N. agencies, such
as UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the World
Bank, the International Telecommunication Union, and
UNICEF could operate, and probably more effectively,
wholly independent from the political United Nations.
Because of the lofty aspirations articulated in its Charter
and subsequent declarations on human rights, the United Na-
tions is a symbol of international cooperation and peace even
as it reflects the dangerous and divided world as it is. There
is little evidence to support the conclusion that either the Se-
curity Council or the General Assembly has made a contribu-
tion to peace or nation-building that could not have made
more effectively if there were no United Nations. All U.N.
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
peacekeeping efforts have been carried out only with the con-
sent of the states directly involved and the support of other
states that sought the same limited objective. All of these op-
erations could have been conducted as well or better and
with less political cost without the involvement of the Secur-
ity Council or the Assembly.
The four-year U.N. expeditionary force sent to the
Congo (now Zaire) in 1960 to maintain the peace and assist in
strengthening a newly independent state involved 94,000
men from 34 states. The cost was $411 million, of which the
United States paid 42 percent. After a thorough examination
of this largest international peacekeeping mission in history, I
came to some sobering conclusions. (See Lefever, Crisis in the
Congo: A United Nations Force in Action, Brookings Institution,
1965, and Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Opera-
tion, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.) The U.N. Congo mission
did not suspend either internal or international politics. By
internationalizing the crisis, it magnified it and probably pro-
longed the conflict, while at the same time occasionally mut-
ing the violence of the internal adversaries. Designed to insu-
late the Congo from the Cold War, the mission insured that
the Cold War would be waged there, but under constraints
that, as it turned out, furthered the interests of the United
States and frustrated the objectives of the Soviet Union. In
retrospect, the goals of restoring order, consolidating the in-
dependence of the Congo, and thus serving the strategic in-
terests of the West could have better been served by a joint
Belgian, French, British, and U.S. peacekeeping effort.
On balance, the political United Nations since its crea-
tion in 1945 may have done more harm than good. The one-
state-one-vote character of the Assembly both distorts politi-
cal reality and subjects the members to bloc voting and ma-
nipulation that often results in resolutions that condemn re-
sponsible foreign policies and overlook irresponsible ones. As
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick has said of the General As-
sembly: "selective name-calling is almost entirely reserved for
the United States and Israel. The Soviet Union goes un-
named in the resolution on Afghanistan; Vietnam goes un-
named in the resolution on Kampuchea-in both of which
cases, aggressive, expansionist invasions and occupations took
place." (Statement before the General Assembly, December
14, 1984.)
I would anticipate no great harm to our national inter-
ests or to the cause of peace, freedom, or justice were the
United Nations to disappear. But as long as it is with us, we
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should fight within it for honesty, fairness, and our interests
as Ambassador Kirkpatrick has so effectively done. She has
made a great contribution to reducing moralistic posturing,
double-standards, and hypocrisy at the East River
headquarters.
A Responsible U.S. Foreign Policy
Since the end of World War II the United States has
sought to defend its security and that of its allies through
NATO and other alliance arrangements. It has pursued
trade, investment, and aid policies that respect the freedom
and independence of all states. It has defined its national in-
terest in terms broad enough to respect the legitimate inter-
ests of other states and peoples. Successive administrations
have pursued a live-and-help-live policy. Our external policies
have not been without flaws, but our shortcomings have been
due more to innocence than to arrogance. The United States
has been the major force for peace, freedom, and develop-
ment since the end of World War II. In sharp contrast the
Soviet Union has been the major threat to peace and free-
dom with its brutal, messianic, and expansionist policies.
The existence of the United Nations has not had a fun-
damental impact on the struggle between tyranny and free-
dom and has played virtually no role in curbing conventional
conflict or in stabilizing the nuclear confrontation. If the
United Nations has been a weak reed, or as some more se-
vere critics would contend, a snare and a delusion, where can
we turn for help in the unending task of seeking greater sta-
bility, freedom, and justice? How can we better curb aggres-
sion and subversion? How can we encourage and guarantee
genuine self-determination and economic development in the
Third World? How can we more effectively deter nuclear war
and make capitulation to nuclear blackmail less likely?
As the leader of the Free World, the United States must
recognize the realities of power and assume the responsibili-
ties that history has thrust upon us. We must be true to our
deepest values. At the same time we must be strong enough
militarily, economically, and politically to deter the Soviet
Union from further expansion by outright conquest, subver-
sion, or nuclear blackmail. This means that we must recog-
nize the importance of maintaining a balance of power in
favor of freedom. Responsible power must be arrayed against
irresponsible power. We must work for peace through
strength, including spiritual strength, and we must defend
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our interests with determination.
We do live in an interdependent world, but this interde-
pendence cannot be expressed in an all-encompassing organi-
zation endowed with the power to suppress diversity and
freedom in the name of universal security and order. In a
world of many states, America should strengthen its alliances
with democratic and other states that pursue live-and-let-live
foreign policies. By diplomacy, trade, investment, economic
aid, and military assistance we should seek to help Third
World states to develop economically and politically. We
should not attempt to flee power, but rather to use it in the
cause of peace, security, and freedom.
The battle within history is never wholly won or lost.
The struggle goes on. But we must turn our back on wishful
thinking and utopian visions if our values and institutions are
to survive. Winston Churchill introduced the final volume of
his history of The Second World War with this theme: "How
the Great Democracies Triumphed, and so Were able to Re-
sume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their
Life." His grim warning is as valid today as it was in 1953
when he wrote it.
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